实践理由、权威与来源命题
【英文题名】 Practical Reasons, Authority and the Sources Thesis
【副题名】 拉兹法律哲学的研究
Research on Raz's Legal Philosophy
【作者】 朱振;
【导师】 张文显;
【学位授予单位】 吉林大学;
【学科专业名称】 法学理论
【学位年度】 2007
【论文级别】 博士
【关键词】 分离命题; 理由; 权威; 来源命题; 排他性/包容性法律实证主义;
【英文关键词】 the Separability Thesis; Reasons; Authority; the Sources Thesis; Exclusive/Inclusive Legal Positivism;

目 录


导 论...............................................................................................................1
一、问题的提出及论题的限定....................................................................1
二、拉兹的理论进路与本文的分析概念....................................................7
三、本文论证的结构安排..........................................................................10
第一章 哈特/德沃金之争与拉兹问题的来源：基于“分离命题”的考察
.........................................................................................................................12
一、分离命题的意涵..................................................................................13
（一）法律与道德关联的多义性及分离命题的界定..........................14
（二）分离命题的意涵：法律、道德与必然......................................21
二、哈特/德沃金之争：承认规则能否包容原则？.................................26
（一）分离命题与理论说明：从命令论到规则论..............................26
（二）承认规则与分离命题：哈特法律哲学的核心建构..................30
（三）原则与规则：德沃金对分离命题的批判..................................34
三、法律实证主义的分裂：安置命题与来源命题..................................42
（一）安置命题......................................................................................47
（二）来源命题......................................................................................53
第二章 权威与理由：关于权威的一般理论...............................................59
一、权威的分类与拉兹所讨论的权威......................................................59
（一）理论权威与实践权威..................................................................60
（二）事实权威与合法权威..................................................................61
（三）合法的实践权威..........................................................................62
二、权威的分析概念：理由......................................................................62
（一）对权威本质之解释的学术史考察..............................................63
（二）权威的解释性概念为什么是理由..............................................68
三、实践权威：一种内容独立的排他性理由..........................................75
第三章 权威的悖论与合法权威...................................................................91
一、问题的来源及本章的论证框架..........................................................91
二、权威与自律的冲突：沃尔夫的哲学无政府主义..............................93
三、权威与证成I：自律、权威及其初步证明.......................................97
（一）表面悖论与二阶理由..................................................................97

（二）权威与自律：一个悖论？..........................................................98
（三）拉兹对权威合法性的初步认可：基于知识与经验以及社会协作
要求的实践权威....................................................................................109
四、权威与证成 II：常规证成命题........................................................110
（一）依赖命题、常规证成命题与优先命题....................................112
（二）基于功能进路的结果论论证模式............................................118
五、拉兹对权威悖论的解决及初步检讨................................................120
（一）从自律到理性的转换：拉兹式的解决方案............................120
（二）协调模式与公断模式：Shapiro对拉兹的批判.......................122
（三）外部批判与内部批判：两种理由概念....................................126
六、实践推理中的自律与权威： “沃尔夫—拉兹”之争的再评价......134
第四章 权威命题与来源命题：拉兹关于来源命题的论证.....................140
一、法律与权威的必然关联....................................................................140
（一）确定性论证：主张合法权威是法律的本质特征....................141
（二）能力论证：法律有能力主张权威............................................143
（三）对 necessity的分析....................................................................146
（四）对 claim的分析.........................................................................149
（五）对 conceptual的分析.................................................................151
二、权威命题与来源命题........................................................................155
（一）对德沃金融贯命题的批判........................................................155
（二）对 Coleman安置命题的批判....................................................161
（三）对来源命题的支持：来自权威的论据....................................163
三、法律与排他性理由： “对权威论据的批判”与本文的反思..........170
（一）排他性实证主义与包容性实证主义论争的核心问题是权威理论
................................................................................................................170
（二）多种批判的可能性与对优先命题的检讨................................172
（三）法律与排他性理由：Larry Alexander对拉兹的批判.............177
（四）另一种安置：权威论如何安置道德？....................................181
结 语...........................................................................................................186
参 考 文 献.................................................................................................189
攻读博士学位期间研究成果.......................................................................201
论文摘要
ABSTRACT

【中文摘要】
拉兹为捍卫法律实证主义提出了来源命题， 即所有的法律都是基于来
源的。来源命题是法律实证主义的强立场，主张一种强分离命题：法律与
道德之间必然不存在关联。 拉兹的这一主张是法律实证主义回应德沃金对
哈特批判的理论成果之一， 从根本上说他要解决的问题是法律与道德的关
系，具体而言就是，承认规则所设置的合法律性判准能否包容道德。就这
一问题而言，拉兹最具理论贡献的是以权威论据捍卫来源命题，他要以权
威命题（法律必然主张合法权威）一举解决法律实证主义内部及其与德沃
金之间的争论。在法律与道德的关系上，当代西方法哲学形成了三个含义
清晰的命题，即拉兹的来源命题、Coleman的安置命题与德沃金的融贯命
题，拉兹的理论目的不但要以权威捍卫来源命题，而且还以权威的论据批
判安置命题与融贯命题。因此，拉兹对法律哲学的重大贡献不在于提出了
分离命题， 而是为法律理论引入了传统上属于政治哲学和道德哲学的权威
概念，并以权威命题来解决法律哲学关于法律与道德之关系的争议。本文
也就是围绕实践理由、权威与来源命题批判性地研究拉兹的法律哲学。
除导论和结语外，文章的主体将分为四大部分。第一章主要陈述作为
拉兹法律哲学研究之框架的哈特/德沃金之争，这部分集中阐述了他们各
自的观点及法律实证主义分离命题的确切意涵， 主要目的是为拉兹的法律
哲学寻找法律实证主义理论脉络下的问题来源。哈特/德沃金之争的核心
在于法律与道德有无必然关联，哈特认为法律与道德不存在必然关联；而

德沃金认为，承认规则既无法识别原则也不是一个社会规则，所有的规则
都是规范规则，法律与道德存在必然的关联。法律实证主义在回应德沃金
的批判时，在承认规则识别法律之判准的内容上发生了分歧，分裂为排他
性与包容性的法律实证主义。所谓的“排他性”就是要在法律身份的识别
上完全排除道德，这就是与德沃金的批判针锋相对的来源命题。拉兹用来
自权威的论据论证了来源命题，由于这里的权威是合法的实践权威，因此
它包含了两个方面， 即实践权威意味着什么和实践权威在什么条件下是正
当的，这也进一步构成了以下两个部分的主体内容。
本文的第二章主要探讨权威的一般理论， 即用理由这个概念来分析实
践权威的性质。在最近的法律哲学中，对法律权威性质与法律义务基础的
探讨复兴了，这已经使得它成为当代法理学最诱人的主题之一。权威是政
治哲学与法律哲学领域中的一个核心概念。在法律哲学中，拉兹为法律理
论引入了权威概念并推进了对权威一般理论的研究， 在法律与权威之间建
立了概念上的关联并以权威命题来解决法律哲学关于法律与道德之关系
的争议。一阶理由与二阶理由的区分是拉兹最重要的哲学洞见之一，这些
洞见已经注意到了， 根据一阶理由的权衡决定应当去做什么不是人们所依
赖的实践推理的唯一模式。有时，我们根据拉兹称之为的二阶理由决定做
什么，他把二阶理由定义为“根据或不根据一个理由而行动的理由” 。拉
兹所认可的二阶理由最重要的范畴是排他的或优先的理由。 实践权威不仅
为理性行动者提供一阶理由， 而且也为他们提供不按照某些其他理由行动
的二阶理由，也就是内容独立的排他性理由。排他性理由不是加入到行动
者之行动中的一阶普通理由，而是要排除或取代所有的一阶理由。这些二
阶理由通过排除行动者根据那些理由来行动优于潜在的竞争理由， 而非因
为比它们更重要。二阶理由排除了行动者自己的独立判断，这在某种意义
上违背了人的自律，自律是启蒙运动的标志，这就需要对权威进行正当性
证明。

于是第三章批判性地讨论了拉兹本人的证成方式， 同时本文对拉兹证
成方式的讨论又是放在权威与自律的悖论这个更一般的理论框架之下进
行的。沃尔夫所指出的权威与自律的悖论是任何权威的证成都绕不过去
的。笔者首先引入了沃尔夫批判权威合法性的哲学无政府主义，依次讨论
了拉兹、Frankfurt 等论者对他的批判性观点，在此基础上建构了讨论这一
悖论的理论进路，即必须从对自律的讨论入手解决这个悖论。其次本文详
细论述了拉兹关于权威的合法性证成，即权威功能的服务观念。为证成权
威，拉兹提出了三个紧密相关的规范性命题，即依赖命题、常规证成命题
和优先命题，前两个命题的结合就是权威的服务观念。最后在批判性地考
察Shapiro批评拉兹的观点之后认为， Shapiro并没有深入到拉兹论证权威
合法性的内部理路中去，进而笔者提出了一种基于威廉斯“内在理由—外
在理由”两分的可能的批判进路。
以上述论述为基础， 本文的第四章详细阐述了拉兹怎样用权威的论据
证明来源命题。权威命题指的是“法律必然主张合法权威” ，拉兹用权威
命题支持来源命题， 从而捍卫其关于法律与道德必然分离的强分离命题的
论证。他把来源命题而非可分离命题看成是实证主义的本质。为实现用权
威命题支持来源命题这一理论任务，拉兹完成了两个论证：一是在法律与
权威之间建立概念上的关联； 二是用法律的权威理论来强有力地支持来源
命题， 与此相关的一个必要的论证步骤是表明Coleman 与德沃金的理论均
无法与法律的权威性质相一致。在具体论证上，笔者首先论证了拉兹在权
威与法律之间建立了概念上的关联并分析了这一判断之中的“必然性” 、
“主张”以及“概念的”等几个关键词。拉兹认为，法律要么主张它拥有
合法权威，要么被认为拥有合法权威，这是法律的性质。为了主张权威，
法律必须有能力拥有权威。其次以权威命题具体论证来源命题，并指出安
置命题以及融贯命题与权威命题不一致，因此是错误的。 “法律必然主张
权威”这一关于法律性质的判断必然会支持来源命题，因为法律规范是排他

性理由，必须能够被独立地识别出来，而不再依赖于它做决定时要考虑
的同样的因素。 最后在评析几种有代表性论者的批判性观点的基础上试图
澄清一些误解并完善拉兹的论证。


关键词：分离命题；理由；权威；来源命题；排他性/包容性法律实证主义


【英文摘要】 In order to defend legal positivism, Joseph Raz develops the sources thesis that all law is source-based. The sources thesis is the strong standpoint of the legal positivism and insists a strong separability thesis that there is no necessary connection between law and morality. This opinion of Raz is one of the theoretical productions in response to Dworkin’s criticism on Hart’s legal positivism. Fundamentally Raz attempts to settle the problem of the relation between law and morality, that is tosay, whether the criteria of legality set in
the rule of recognition can include morality. On this respect, Raz’s most
important contribution is that he defends the sources thesis by the argument of
authority. He attempts to settle deputes among different legal positivists and
those between them and Dworkin through the authority thesis (law necessarily
claims legitimate authority). There are clearly three theses concerning the
relationship between law and morality: the sources thesis of Raz, the
incorporation thesis of Coleman and the coherence thesis of Dworkin. Raz’s
intention is not only in defense of the sources thesis by authority, but criticizes
the incorporation thesis and the coherence thesis. Accordingly, Raz’s great
contribution to legal philosophy lies not in the sources thesis, but in his
introduction of the concept of authority which belongs to the realm of political
philosophy and moral philosophy traditionally and settles deputes of the
relation between law and morality in legal philosophy by the authority thesis.
This article critically investigates Raz’s legal philosophy according to the
practical reasons, authority and the sources thesis.
The article can be divided into four parts apart from the introduction and
the epilogue. The first chapter mostly states the Hart/Dworkin Debate as the
framework of Raz’s legal philosophy. In order to search the origin of problem
in the context of legal positivism for Raz’s legal philosophy, this chapter
concentrates on the respective views and true meaning of their separability
thesis in legal positivism. The center of the debate consists in whether there is
necessary connection between law and morality. Hart thinks that there is no
necessary connection between law and morality, while Dworkin thinks that the
rule of recognition can neither identify the principles, nor can it be a social
rule; all rules are normative, and that there is necessary connection between
law and morality. When legal positivists respond to the critiques from
Dworkin, they diverge on the content of the legality of the rule of recognition.
Thus legal positivism is divided up into the exclusive legal positivism and the
inclusive legal positivism. The so-called “exclusivity” means to exclude
morality while identifying the legal identity. It is the sources thesis against
Dworkin. Raz justifies the sources thesis by the argument from authority. Here
the concept of authority is the legitimate practical authority, and thus the
concept includes both what the practical authority means and what conditions
enable practical authority to be legitimate. The two aspects constitute main
body of the following two parts.
The second chapter of this article discusses the general theory of
authority and analyses the nature of practical authority according to the

concept of reasons. In recent legal philosophy, the inquiry into the nature of
legal authority and the foundation of legal obligation has enjoyed a revival that
has made it one of the most seductive topics in contemporary jurisprudence.
Authority is the central concept of the legal philosophy and the political
philosophy. In legal philosophy, Raz introduces the concept of authority for
legal theory and advances the research about authority. He establishes the
conceptual connection between law and authority and resolves the debates
about the relations between them in legal philosophy. The difference of the
first-order reasons and the second-order reasons is one of Raz's most important
philosophical insights that have noticed that the determination of what ought
to be done on the balance of first-order reasons is not the only mode of
practical reasoning upon which people rely. Sometimes we decide what to do
on the basis of what Raz calls second-order reasons, which he defines as
“reasons to act on or refrain from acting on a reason.” The most important
category of second-order reasons recognized by Raz is that of exclusionary or
peremptory reasons. Practical authority not only provide rational agents with
first-order reasons to act, but also with second–order reasons for not acting on
certain other reasons, namely content-independent and exclusionary reasons
for action. The exclusionary or peremptory reasons are not the first-order
ordinary reasons added to the action of agent, but exclude and replace all
first-order reasons. These second-order reasons prevail over potentially
competing reasons, not by outweighing those reasons, but by precluding an
agent’s acting on them. The second–order reasons preclude the agent’s own
independent judgment. To some extent, this breaches personal autonomy,
because the autonomy is the symbol of the enlightenment. Thus we need to
justify the authority.